RECENT CASES.
CARIms-Cmmoi

CAR.U.-DRAYMr;-A

concern

engaged in the

teaming business, hauling merchandise from depots to warehouses, and from
warehouses to stores, transported merchandise in a team belonging to
another concern. The merchandise disappeared. Held: The firm was a
common carrier, being ready to do. business for anyone who sought its
services for compensation. Hinchliffe v. Wenig Teaming Co., 113 N. E.
7o7 I1. (i916).
To constitute a common carrier it is not essential that the person'or
coiporation undertaking such service own the means of transportation.
Blakiston v. Davis, Turner & Co., 42 Pa. Sup. 39o (igio); Ingram v. Am.
Forwarding Co., i6z Ill. App. 476 (i9ii); Kettenhoffen v. Globe Transfer
Co., 27 Pac. 295 (Wash. 1912). A lighterman carrying goods for all choosing
to employ him, was held a common carrier, even though he let his barges
to one person for one voyage. Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson, 2o W. R. 633
(Eng. 1872), not so with wharfingers transporting goods for their customers from ships to their warehouse, Chattock v. Bellamy, 64 Q. B. (N. S.)
251 (Eng. 1895); Consolidated Tea Co.'v. Oliver's Wharf, 2 K. B. 395
(Eng. igio); or a logging railroad only carrying for its owners, Anderson
v. Smith Powers Logging Co., 139 Pac. 736 (Oregon 194).
Where the carrier holds itself out to serve only those with whom
it chooses to contract, its liability as an insurer, is of course, denied, Electric.Supply Stores v. Gaywood, ioo L T. R. 8 55 (Eng. 19o9); Watkins
v. Cottrell, 52 T. L. I. 91 (Eng. 1915) ; so in the case of furniture removers,
Meisner v. Ferry Co., 118 N. IV. 14 (Mich. i9o8); ferrying company,
operating boat to its own pleasure ground, Leader v. Rys. Co., s8 Pittsb.
L J. (Pa. I9io) ; street railway carrying newspapers for certain publishers
but see Lloyd v. Haugh, 223 Pa. 148 (igog), where a storage concern holding
itself out to the public as engaged in the general moving of household
goods, although it discriminated as to persons whom it would serve, was
held a common carrier.
"Jitney" busses are classed as common carriers and, as such, liable
to municipal regulations, Dresser v. City of Wichita, 153 Pac. zi94 (Kansas
1916) ; Huston v. City of Des Moines, x56 N. V. 883 (Iowa 1916) ; Memphisv. State, z79 S. NV. 631 (Tenn. 19z5); also taxicabs, Donnelly v. P. & R.
Ry. Co., 53 Pa. pup. 78 (1913); Brown Shoe Co. v. Hardin, 87 S. E. 1014
(-%V.Va. i9g6); Carlton v. Boudar, 88 S. E. 174 (Va. 1916), and eva.n
the operator of an incline for hire, transporting .the goods of all vessels
plying the river to the railroad cars, has been held within the rule, Joest
v. Clarendon Packet Co., 183 S. W. 7s9 (Ark. 1916).
Since a common carrier must be a bailee as to goods transported an
express company acting as agent for the owner in arranging for the transportation or storage of goods without having possession of, or transporting
them, is not liable as a common carrier, Tilles v. American Express Co.,
x86 S. W. io2 (Miss. 1916). It has been held otherwise where a for-warding company has goods hauled by its hired truckman to the-railroad,
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Blakeston v. Davies, .supra. So where cars are leased to the railroads,
the lessor was not a common carrier, Ellis v. 1. C. C., 237 N. S. 434 (1914);
but see Shaw v. K. C. Stockyards Co., 145 Pac. 832 (Kan. x95), where a
stockyards company charging railroad companies for each car moVed over
its tracks was held a common carrier. A 1ransferman's duty as a carrier
ends with delivery of the goods intrusted to him at the place of destination.
Brown Shoe v. Hardin, sipra, but where a custom to receive baggage
destined for morning trains the night before, prevailed, the railroad received
the baggage qua carrier and not as warehouseman. Crist v. D, L. & W.
R. R., 17 Lack. J. i (Pa. 1916).
CONTRACTS-IMPOSSIBILIT"Y OF PERFORMANCE AS ExcusE-Two persons
entered into a contract whereby one agreed to furnish the other's cattle
with plenty of good grass during the grazing season. He failed to do so
due to the most severe drought which had been known in that part of the
state. Hcld: -The unprecedented drought, an act of God, did not absolve
him from his liability to furnish the grass. Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed.
817 (Kan. i9x6).
The principal case is in accord with the general rule that one who
makes a positive agreement to do a lawful act is not absolved from liability
for a failure to fulfill his covenant by a subsequent impossibility of performance caused by an act of God. - Paradine v. Jayne, Allyn 26 (Eng.
i655), was the initial case on the subject and it has been followed almost
12
unanimously in this country. Summers v. Hubbard & Co., 153 Ill.
(1894);. Link Belt Engineering Co. v. United States, x42 Fed. 243 (Pa.
i9o5). But where it clearly appears that the parties to the contract must
have known when they made it that its performance would be impossible
unless a thing then in existence should exist at the time of the performance,
then many authorities allow the obligor to be absolved from liability for
his failure to perform. Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. Soo (i89t); Ontario
Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Packing Co., 134 Cal. 21 (roor); Krause v. Board
of Trustees, i6z Ind. 278 (19o3). Whether or not the obligor is absolved
from his liability for non-performance if his performance is rendered impossible by an act of God depends upon the true construction of the contract.
The rule declared by the Supreme Court is that where one at the time of
making his contract must have known or could have reasonably anticipated
the possible happening of the event causing the impossibility of performance, and notwithstanding he unqualifiedly undertakes to perform, he must
do so, or pay the damages resulting from his failure so to do. Chicago Ry.
Co. v. Hoyt, x49 U. S. z (x892); United States v. Gleason, 20 Sup. Ct.
228 (19oo).
Where an ambiguity or uncertainty arises in the contract which cannot be removed by an examination of the agreement alone, parol evidence
of the circumstances under which it was made may be admitted to prove
the real intention of the parties. Proctor v. Hartigan, 139 Mass. 554 (885) ;.
Kilby Mfg. Co. v. Fire Proofing Co., r32 Fed. 957 (CoL 1904). For other
variations in principles affecting this subject, see 64 UxvERasrrY or PENNsYLVAxrA LAW REviEw, p. 2o8.
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CRIMINAL

LAw-EVIDE-SCE-CONFFSSIONS-PRMISE

OF

IMM42UNITY-A

prisoner in the custody of an officer confessed to a crime after a promise
of immunity if he would agree to testify at other trials. Held: His confession was involuntary and inadmissible- People v. Buckminster, 113 N. E.
713 (I1. ipi6).
The authorities in England and this country are unanimous in holding
that a confession not freely and voluntarily made cannot be admitted in
evidence. Rex v. Thompson, 2 Q. B. 17 (Eng. 1893); Collins v. CoM., 25
S. W. 743 (Ky. 1894) ; D raughn v. State, 25 So. 153 (Miss. I899).But the
fact that the accused was under arrest at thV time of confessing is not
of itself sufficient to exclude the confession. Sparf v. United States, ISo
U. S. 51 (Sup. Ct. 1894); Hathaway.v. Com., 825 W. 400 (Ky. 19o4).
Confessions obtained, by violence or under threat of mob violence are
clearly inadmissible, -Whit
v. State, 78 Miss. 255 (igoo); Edmonson v.
State. 72 Ark. i85 (I9O4). or when made to a jailor or nxosecuting officer
upon threat of severe punishment or promise of pardon. L*Roesel v. State,
62 N. J. L.216 (1898) ; McMaster v. State, 34 So. 156 (Miss. 19o3 .FAdvice
that the agcused "had better tell the truth" has been held to vitiate the
confession. Rex v. Thompson, supra; Hardin v. State, 66 Ark. 53 (I88).
';Although confessions obtained under pressure are inadmissible, yet
the facts discovered in consequence of them are universally admissible. L(
Rex v. Gould, 9 C. & P. 364 (Eng. 184o); Laros v. Com., 84 Pa. 202 (1877).
(For other cases on the subject, see 63 Ux1vsiuSTY OF PENNSYLvANIA LAW
REIEW, p. 570.)
CRIMINAL

LAW-FALSE

IMPERSONATION-UNITED

STATES

STATUTES-

Prisoner represented himself to be a certain member of the House. of
Representatives to obtain money thereby. Held: False impersonation of
a member of Congress is a crime under a statute declaring it to be criminal
to "falsely assume or pretend to be an officer or employee acting under
the authority of the United States," Lamar v. United States, 36 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 535 (1915).

There is little authority to be found in regard to this case. One case
expressly declares a member of Congress to be a public officer, People ex rel.
Kelly v. Common Council of the City of Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. 503 (i88z);
and a state senator in State v. Clendenin, 24 Ark. 78 0862); a member of
the state legislature in People v. Provinnes, 34 Cal. 5-o (1868); Scott v.
Strobach, 49 Ala. 477 (1873); were held to be public officers. In "Blount's
Case," Wharton St. Tr. 200 (1797), however, it was held that a United
States Senator is not such a public officer as to be liable for impeachment.
Authority is in accord on the construction rule laid down that even a
penal statute "is not to be narrowed by construction so as to fail to give
full effect to its plain terms as made manifest by its text and context,"
U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1867); U. S. v. Corbett,
215 U. S. 233 (1909).
Under this rule of construction the principal case holds that it is immaterial whether or not the act personated would have been an authorized
act if done by the officer personated. This is seemingly in conflict with
U. S. v. Taylor, io8 Fed. 621 (i9oo); U. S.v. Ballard, 18 Fed. 757 (1902).
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CRIMINAL L.w-FoR.MER JEOPARDY-Following a conviction of assault and
battery and sentence by a justice of the peace, a party being subsequently
indicted for an assault with intent to rape based on the same acts, pleaded
former jeopardy. Held: The justice had no jurisdiction to try this graver
offense; therefore, the accused could not have been in jeopardy and the
plea was bad. Crowley v. State, 113 N. F-658 (Ohio 1916).
It would seem that this decision is not supported by the weight of
authority. The majority of courts hold the test to determine the validity
of a plea of autrefois acquit or atirefois convict is to determine whether
the evidence which supported the former conviction will support the present.
U. S. v. Nickerso n, 17 How. 2o4 (1854); Com. v. Fredericks, 155 Mass.
455 (1893); Floyd v. State, So Ark. 94 (i9o6). It is generally held that
one who has been tried for a crime less in degree than the offense for
which he is indicted may successfully plead former jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 9 Kulp _73 (Pa. i9oo); People v. Tong, 155 Cal. 579
(i9o9). Assault being a necessary element in many a.ttempts to commit
felonies, it would follow logically that a conviction or acquittal on the
charge of assault and battery would bar a subsequent prosecution for the
graver crime founded on the assault; and so it has been held. People v.
McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192 (19o2) ; State v. Belvins, 134 Ala. 213 (igoi). This
has been followed, contra to the principal case, where the justice.who tried
the assault had no jurisdiction over the greater offense. People v. Purcell,
I6 N. Y. S. 199 (1891); Storrs v. State, 129 Ala. ioi (igoo); State v.
Simpson, 138 N. W. 473 (Iowa i9i2). In People v. Purcell, supra, the
facts were the same as in the principle case. In speaking of the first trial
in the justice court, the court said: "It was a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the guilt of defendant upon the accusation then made

against him

. . . he is entitled to protection from the second jeopardy."

This latter decision overruled a former New York decision on the same
point. People v. Saunders, 4 Park Crim. Rep. 196 (N. Y. 1859).
The rule as laid down by the principal case is not without authority,
however. State v. Hattabough, 66 Ind. 223 (z879); Boswell v. State, 2o
Fla. 869 (1884). It is well settled that if the justice had no jurisdiction
to try the lesser charge the plea of former jeopardy will not be upheld.
Brown v. The State, i2o Ala. 378 (x898); Gibson v. The State, 47 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 489 (1904).
CRIMINAL LAW-INTOXIcATxG LIQUORS-CLUB

LOCKRS-It

is not within

the scope of the police power of a town or state to prohibit members of a
club from keeping intoxicating liquors for their own use in their lockers.
Courtland v. Larson, Ii3 N. E. 5x (Ill. i916).
Police power as defined by Justice Holmes, "extends to all the great
public needs, what prevailing opinion deems immediately necessary and
essential to the public welfare:' Noble Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104
(igIo). In the exercise of which, it has been held, a legislature may
entirely prohibit the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, as inimical
to public health, morals, or safety. State v. Williais, i46 N. C. 618 098o)i
But a statute which prohibits persons from keeping liquors solely for their
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own use is unconstitutional, and therefore void. State v. Gilman, 33 W.
Va. 146 (889); State v. White, 71 Kan. 356 (i9o5); Partridge v. State,
114 S. W. 21.J (Ark. i90o8), because spirits and distilled liquors are universally
admitted to be subjects of ownership and property, and by the Constitution
there can be no taking of property without due process of law. State v.
Young, 237 Ill. i96 (19o8) ; Eidge v. City of Bessemer, 164 Ala. 599 (19io).
Yet a club or association must not be used as a means to evade the provisions of an ordinance, statute, or local option law, relative to the use
of intoxicating liquors. Comm. v. Campbe.l, 133 Ky. So (igog); City of
Decatur v. Schlick, 269 111. 18x (igi5). Possession of intoxicants is not
per se unlawful, without proof of intent to dispose of them in violation
of a governing act. Tilsworth v. State, Ioi Pac. 288 (Okla. i909). The
statutes of some states are so framed that it is a punishable offense to
have liquor in one's possession, though intended solely for his own consumption, if certain conditions are not complied with. Bice v. State, io9
Ga. 117 (igoo); Easley v. Pegg, 63 S. C. 98 (goi).
Yet such a statute
has been held not to apply to facts almost identical to those of the principal
case. Donald v. Scott, 76 Fed. 554 (S. C. 1895).
There are a few courts that hold that; although a property right in
intoxicating liquors is recognized by the law, yet such a statute is constitutional, and a valid exercise of a state's police power. Town of Selma
v. Brewer, 98 Pac. 61 (Cal. i9o9) ; State v. Phillips, 67 So. 651 (Miss. i9x5).
EviDExC--PAROLE

PROMISE INDICATING THE EXECUTION

OF A WVlTrTEN

CONTRAcr-A parole stipulation upon the faith of which the writing in

suit was executed was offered to vary the written agreement. Held: Such
evidence was admissible. Excelsior Saving Fund & Loan Soc. v. Fox, 98
Atl. 593 (Pa. 1916).
The principal case follows the long line of Pennsylvania authorities
enunciating the peculiar doctrine of this state. Kostenbater v. Peters, So
Pa. 438 (1876); Haney v. Moorehead, 61 Super. 187 (Pa. 1916), where the
breach of the oral inducing contract is held to be a fraud on contractor's
rights, Gandy v. Weckerly, 22o Pa. 285 (1908). All the other jurisdictions,
however, hold that a contract in writing, complete on its face, cannot be
varied by a parole agreement, Iron Works v. Vagner, i54 Pac. 460 (Wash.
1916), even though the oral stipulation was the inducement for entering
into written agreement. Reed v. Moore, 154 Pac. 348 (Okla. 1916). Even
in Pennsylvania it must be alleged and proven that the oral agreement was"
the inducement, and statements and circumstances leading up to the execution are not admissible. Sutcliffe v. Bakes, 62 Super. 65 (Pa. ig96). And
where a paragraph in the written contract makes all previous communications inconsistent therewith void, a parole contemporaneous agreement is
inadmissible. Trouter Mfg. Co. v. Blaney, 6x Super. 374 (Pa. 1916);
Steamship Co. v. Pechin, 6i Super. 4o (Pa. i916). A parole agreement not
contemporaneous and not omitted by fraud or mistake is not competent to
vary a written contract of the parties, Lowry v. Ry., 238 Pa. 9 (1913). The
uncorroborated testimony of the offeror is not sufficient to prove an oral
contemporaneous agreement, Armour v. Express Co., 52 Super. 329 (Pa.
1913).
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The rule of admissibility has not been extended to cover cases of
instruments under seal. Wodock v. Robinson, 148 Pa. 503 (1893), especially
where the deed is complete on its face and not ambiguous, Hollis v. Hollis,
8 Berks 85 (Pa. i916); and even in ordinary contracts the Supreme Court
has shown a tendency to favor a return to the English rule, Dixon v. Glass
Co., 169 Pa. 167 (185) ; Fuller v. Law, 207 Pa. ioi (i9O3). But the cases
expressing such a feeling have not been extended as exemplified by the
principal case. This is especially true of the Superior Court. Haney v.
Moorehead, 6i Super. 187 (Pa. 1916); Chesney v. Guernsey, 61 Super. 490
(Pa. z916).
FRAUD--RECKLESS STATEMENTs-Peek v. Derry-The vendor of a small
tract of land misrepresented the number of acres therein, though he honestly
believed his statements. Held: Where a vendor makes a false representation of a material fact, susceptible of knowledge and relating to a matter
in which he has an interest, and of which he- might be expected to have
knowledge, and makes such unqualifiedly as of his own knowledge, with
intent to induce action, he cannot plead his honest belief in its truth.
Schlechter v. Felton, 158 N. W. 813 (Minn. 1916).
This case is directly contrary to the doctrine of the leading case of
Peek v. Derry. 14 Appeal Cases. .37 (i09o, that there must be'actual
fraud and not mere gross negligence; that an honest belief in the truth
of the statement is a good defense.
The vendee must prove scienter on the part of the defendant, i. e., that
the defendant knew the statements were false or had the equivalent of
such knowledge, Griswold v. Gebbie, z26 Pa. 353 (1889; Colorado Springs
Co. v. Wright. 44 Colo. 179 (igo8); Snyder v. Stemmons, i5' Mo. App. z56
(igio). This scienter may be proved by showing that the assertion was
made as of the defendant's own knowledge so unqualifiedly that it is implied
that he had actual knowledge, Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 12r (i869); Watson
v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241 (1889), though in Pennsylvania, where a distinction
is drawn between fraud and evidence of fraud, recklessness is only prima
facie evidence of deceit, Griswold v. Gebbie, supra. If it was his duty t.
know, the conclusion that he did know is irresistible. Watson v. Jones,
supra. One negotiating a trade is bound to know, and cannot assert to be
true that which he does not know to be true. Prestwood v. Carlton, 162
Ala. 327 (igo); Katham v. Comstock, 140 Wis. 427 (i9o9). It has been
held that he cannot by his recklessness cast upon the vendee the duty of
measuring* the land, but that the latter may rely on the former's statements. Ledbetter v. Davis, 121 Ind. i19 (1889); Westerman v. Corder, 86
Kan. 239 (19T2). In most states the vendor, who has misrepresented
the number of acres in a tract, is liable, even though he has pointed out
to the vendee the boundaries, Ledbetter v. Davis, supra; Griswold v. Gebbie,
supra, though Mfassachusetts holds that the duty of inspection rests upon
the vendee. Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen 212 (Mass. i86z). It has been
held that a scicnter need not be proved, and that the defendant, if a party
to the contract, is liable, even though the representation is innocent. Aldrich
v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23 (1go8).
I
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HUSBAND AND W1FE-LIABILITY FOR NECESSARIES WHEN MARRIAGE IS
VoiD--A man, who had gone through the form of marriage with a woman,
despite her having a husband then living, who had lived with her and
had held her out as his wife, was sued by a tradesman for the price of

necessaries bought by his alleged wife, on his credit. Held: That for the
purpose.of the present action, his status was the same as if the marriage

had been legal. Frank v. Carter, u13 N. E. 549 (N. Y. 1916).
The general rule is that when a wife purchases necessaries on her
husband's credit, the law presumes that she does so with his authority.
Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 25o (i89i). The presumption is prima facie
only, and may be rebutted by proof that the husband notified the tradesman
not to sell to his wife on his credit, Hibler v, Thomas, 99 111. App. 355
(1goi), or that he made suitable provision for his wife, either by furnishing
her with an adequate allowance, Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N. Y. 75
(19o3), or by supplying the necessaries himself. Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41
Barb. 558 (N. Y. 1863).
The basis of this presumptive agency, on the part of the wife, arises
from the fact of cohabitation and the presumption is so strong that if
a man cohabits with a woman, holding her out to be his wife, he is liable
for goods furnished to her, during their cohabitation; even toward a tradesman who knew they were not married. Watson v. Threlkeld. 2 Esp. 637
(Eng. 1798) ; Ryan v. Sams, T2 Q. B. 46o (Eng. 1848). A fortiori, this would
be the case, where, as in the principal case, the tradesman supposed them
to be married and there had been a marriage in fact, but which marriage
was void. Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167 (Eng. 1829); Johnstone v. Allen,
6 Abbot's Practice, N. S., 306 (N. Y. 1869). The husband is estopped to
set up bigamy as a defense to the action, Robinson v. Nahon, I Camp. 245
(Eng. i8o8), even though the parties have separated, provided the supposed
husband has not made any provision for his wife's support. Johnstone v.
Allen, supra. It has been held, however, that where no marriage has in
fact taken place, the separation of the parties relieves the husband, so
called, from liability for goods furnished after that incident. Munro v.
DeChemant, 4 Camp. 215 (Eng. 1815); Johnstone v. Allen, supra.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT

FOR QUIET ENJOYMENT-A

landlord

after giving a tenant a covenant for quiet enjoyment leased the adjoining
premises as an auction room. The auctions being conducted in such a
manner as to injure the tenant's business, the latter thereupon sued on the
covenant. Held: The landlord had not authorized or actively participated
in the nuisance, and therefore was not liable, either for breach of covenant
for quiet enjoyment, or derogation from grant. Malzy v. Eicholz, 115 L. T.

9 (Eng. 1916).
The general rule is that the landlord must take an active part in the
act complained of, to be liable. Jaeger v. Mansions, Limited, 87 L. T. Rep.
69o (i9o3). He is liable only for his own acts and the acts of those claiming title paramount to the tenant, Williams v. Gabriel, I K. B. 155 (Eng.
i9o6); Georgeous v. Lewis, 128 Pac. 768 (Cal. 1912), Cohen v. Hayden,
157 N. W. 217 (Iowa i9x6) ; but not for the acts of third persons. Talbott
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v. English, 156 Ind. 299 (19o). It is now settled in England that in the
absence of an express covenant for quiet enjoyment, une will be implied
from the mere relation of landlord and tenant. Budd-Scott v. Daniel, 2
K. B. 351 (i9o3). There are decisions in this country in accord with that
view. Greer v. Boston Little Circle Zinc Co., 103 S. W. 151. (Mo. 1907).
Some courts, however, refuse to imply the covenant in the absence of the
words "demise" or "grant," Lovering v. Lovering, 13 N. H. 517 (1843);
Mershon v. Williams, 63 N. J. L. 398 (1899) ; while others hold any words
of leasing are sufficient to raise the implication. Maule v. Ashmead, 2o
Pa. 482 (1853); Hamilton v. Wright's Admin., 28 Mo. 199 (1859). It has
been held in England that any interference by a landlord with the tenant's
expected use of the premises is a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, Tebb v. Cave, i Ch. 642 (Igoo), and also a derogation 'from the
grant of the landlord. Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton, 2 Q. B. 836 (1894).
The court in the principal case holds that there must be some obligation
imposed by the grant, and an active participation in an act questioning the
tenant's right, by the landlord, in order to make him liable for a derogation
from grant.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FOREMANT-WHEN

VICE PRINCIPAL AND WHEN

FELLow SERVzNT-Foreman A was killed by negligence of foreman B in
adjusting a machine near where A was rightfully standing, Held: When a
foreman is discharging duties imposed by reason of his superior position,
he is vice principal, and the master is liable for his negligence. -Anderson
v. Keystone Type Foundry Co., 98 AtL 696 (Pa. 1916).
The test of the master's liability is not the rank of the servant, B. & 0.
RL' R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1893); nor the superior control,
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346 (i896); nor the
place or machinery, R. R. v. Barker, 169 Ind. 67o (i9o8) ; but the character
of the negligent act which caused the injury. Northern Pacific R. R. Co.
v. Peterson, supra; R. R. v. Barker, supra. But some courts cling to -the
older and contrary rule that one upon whom rests a duty to obey is a servant,
Railway Co. v. Wrenn, 50 S. W. 210 (Tex. 1899); or conversely that power
to manage a business and employ and discharge servants make a man a
vice principal. Shumway v. Manufacturing Co., 98 Mich. 4TI (1894).
According to the better rule, a mere servant becomes a vice principal
with respect to a fellow servant, when he is performing a duty owed by
the master to that servant, Mercer v. R. R. Co., 154 N. C. 399 (i91 ); and
a foreman performing mere business details which the master may assign
is reduced to the rank of a fellow servant. Iron Co. v. La Bianca, io6 Va.
83 (i9o6).
Hence there arises the "dual capacity" doctrine which holds
the master liable for negligence of the vice principal acting as such, Railroad
Co. v. Atwell, 198 I1. 2oo (1902), though not liable when the vice principal
is acting as fellow servant. Reeser v. Electric Co., 246 Pa. 24. (1914).
Some jurisdictions reject this doctrine. Stone v. Kraft, 31 Ohio 287

(1877). Once a vice principal, always a vice principal. Shumway.v. Mfg..
Co., supra. But an employee cannot be a vice principal and a fellow servait
at the same time. If there is a doubt, it will be held to have been done
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in the capacity in which it was his special duty to act, though the nature
of the act may be considered in determining the character in which he
was acting. R. R. Co. v. Baldwin, II3 Tenn. 409 (i9o4). Generally a
master is liable for the acts or negligence of independent contractors, if
the master trusts to them duties which he himself owes, Ortlip v. Traction
Co., I98 Pa. 586 (igoi) ; though there are a very few cases contra, Devlin
v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 47o (1882).
MASTER AND SERVANT-WHAT CONSTITUTES REA.TIoN-A servant was
negligently injured while riding in his employer's car from his place of
employment to the boarding-camp, his carriage being in pursuance of his
contract of employment. Held: The servant was a passenger and the
"fellow servant" rule did not apply. Williams v. Tjnion Switch & Signal'
Co., I58 N. W. goi (S. D. x916).
The exact relation of a servant to his master while riding in vehicles
operated by other servants of the master is a question on which the courts
are not in harmony. Generally, when the servant is riding in the course
of, or as part of, his employment, the relation of master and servant
continues. Hando v. Loudon, etc., Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 439 N. (1867);
Louisville & iNashville R. R. Co. v. Stuber, iog Fed. 934 (igo). Some
courts, however, hold that even here, the relation is that of carrier and
passenger. Carswell v. Macon, etc., R. R. Co., 1I8 Ga. 826 (i9o3); Haas
v. St. Louis Ry. Co., III Mo. App. 7o6 (spos).
Where the servant is being transported to or from his work, the transportation being furnished gratuitously, it has been held he is a fellowservant of those operating the vehicle. Tumney v. Midland Ry. Co, L. R.
App. 345
I C. P. 291: (866) ; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. O'Donnell, 114 Ill.
(i90o4) ; St. Bernard Cypress Co. v. Johnson,- 222 Fed. 246 (r915)." But
there is authority which regards him as a passenger. Dickenson v. West
End St. Ry., 177 Mass. 3*65 "(iOi); Harris v. R. R. Co., 69 W. Va. 65 (i9p),
On the other hand, where the transportation is furnished in part consideration for services, the general rule, like that in the principal case, is
that the relation is that of carrier and passenger. Hebert v. Portland R. R.
Co., i3 Me. 315 (igo7); Harris v. Puget Sound Ry., 52 Wash. 289 (i9o);
Elmer v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 251 Pa. St. 5o5 (igx6). And also, when he
is riding for purposes of his own, the same relation exists, regardless of
whether or not the transportation is furnished gratuitously. Davis v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 45 Fed. 543 (89s).
TOO ALLEGED PASSENG-A boy, ten
NEGLIGENCE-CARRIER-LIABILIT
years old, invited by the motorman of a street car to ride. on the front
platform, free of charge, was injured by the motorman's negligent operation
of the car. Held:- The company owed him the same duty as it owed a
passenger. Hayes v. Dampsell, 13 N. F_ 61r (IlL. 1g16).The decision of the principal case is in accord with the settled rule
of law. Solomon v. Public Service Ry. Co., 87 N. J. L.284 (i954). Children
of immature years, who innocently accept the invitation of a motorman or
conductor to ride free of charge are passengers and entitled to the rights
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of passengers. Little Rock Traction and Elec. Co. y. Nelson, 66 Ark. 494
(i8g.). The fact that the agent acted contrary to his instructions is immaterial. The act was one within the general scope of his authority. Wilton
v. Middlesex R. Co., 1o7 Mass. xo8 (1871).
While there are dicta to the effect that a different rule prevails in the
case of an adult (see Danbeck v. New Jersey Traction Co., 57"N. J. L. 463,
and Hayes v. Sampsell, supra); still it has been held that if there is no
collusion on his part with the agent to defraud the company, he is not
deprived of his rights as a passenger. L & N. R. R. Co. v. Scott's Adm'r,
Io8 Ky. 392 (i9oo). But where, however, a person attempts, in bad faith,
to defraud the carrier by riding free, even though with the consent of the
conductor, he is a trespasser, to whom the only duty of the carrier is to
abstain from wilful or reckless injury. Purple v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 114
Fed. 123 (i9o2); Kruse v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co, i33 S. W. 841
(Ark. x9z).
If, however, the carrier itself, or a person having full authority to
do so, invites a party to ride free, he is then carried lawfully as a passenger and entitled to all the care which the law requires of the passenger
carrier, Phila. and Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468 (1852). So a
party riding on a free pass is a passenger, G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
McGown, 65 Tex. 64o (886).
PARTNE-SHIP-CONTIACTS OF ONE PARTNER-LIAtirJTY-A member of
a partnership engaged in the manufacture of corsets, purchased notion
novelties in the firm name but for use in a store which he owned and
conducted individually. After notice the other partner offered to persuade
his copartner to pay for the goods out of his oivn funds. Held: The partnership was not bound originally nor by ratification. Samstay v. Ortheiner,
97 Ati 865 (Conn. 1915).
Each member of a partnership is, in contemplation of law, a general
agent of the firm and may bind it by acts done within the scope of the
partnership business. Saving Fund Soc. v. Bank, 36 Pa. 498 (i86o); Davis
v. Richards, 45 Miss. 499 (1871). Even though as between the partners
the act may be fraudulent, Capelle v. Hunt, Federal Cas. 2391 (1875).. The
right is founded, not by the terms of the appointment, but by the nature of
the partnership agreement and relations, Hoge v. Rush, 173 Pa. 264 (1896).
In general the language of the agreement and the ordinary usages ofthe business in which the firm is engaged determine the scope of the partnership business, Clark v. R. Co., 136 Pa. St. 408 (i&go); but it has been
held, too, that the nature of the business conducted by the particular firm
determines the scope of the authority, Fertilizer Co. v. Reynolds, 79 Ala.
497 (r895); Crane Co. v. Tierney, 175 Ill. 79 0898). When, however, -the
ict done is without the scope of the partnership business, the intendment
of the law is that the partner deals with the third person on his private
account, notwithstanding the use of the partnership name, and the firm
is not bolnd. Sutton v. Irwine, 12 S. & R. (Pa. 1824).
But the adoption by the firm of an unauthorized act of a partacr will
make it liable therefor, Howe v. McVay, I NV. N. C. 46 (Pa. 1874). To
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hold a partnership liable on an alleged ratification of an unauthorized act
of a member. the partnership must assent to the precise provisions of that
contract, Robert's Appeal, 92 Pa. 407 (iS8o), and the burden o.f proving
such ratification is on him who seeks to establish it. McNeils Exec. v.
Reynolds, 9 Ala. 313 (1846).
PROPERTY-RESTRICTIVE

COVENANT-SINGLE

DwEuLtG---OR

FLAT-Ac-

cording to a covenant in a deed of conveyance, the grantee agreed not to /
build any building "except a single detached dwelling house." Held: This
covenant permits the erection of a flat building. Voorhees v. Blum, 113
N. E. 593 (Ill. 1916).
Restrictive covenants in deeds are not favored by the courts and any
doubt as to the intention of the parties is to be resolved against the
(N. Y. -2-). In ascertaining
. .v . "
grantor, Sonn v. Heil
the intention, the content of the instrument, the attendant circumstances,
and the situation of the parties are all to be considered. Skillman v. Smathehirst, S7 N. J. Eq. x (i8g8); Saunders v. Dixon, 114 Ito. App. 229 (1905).
These rules are universally recognized and adherence to them explains the
various interpretations put on words apparently of similar meaning. So
it has been held a covenant against occupation of premises "except for one
dwelling house" was held to prohibit the erection of a two-story flat house,
Harris v. Rorabach, 137 Mich. -"92 (19o4), while a covenant that "nothing
but a dwelling house shall ever be erected" was held to permit the erection
_
of a flat or apartment house. Johnson v. Jones, 244 Pa. 386 (1914).
covenant, agaistan. building except -"dwelling -houses"- is not. violatedl
't2y-the erection of apartments. Bates v. Togeling, 137 App. Div. .578,
.'But a covenant
r-o'of'Tenements.'Roth v. Jung, 79 App. D ."i '.
at only one single dwelling should be erected is broken by the erection of
apartments, Gillis v. Bailey, 17 N. H. i8 (i845), though in Hutchinson v.
Ulrich, 145 IIl. 336 (1893), on the authority of which the principal case
was decided, an exactly opposite interpretation was given to identical words.
A covenant merely against the erection of more than one house is not
violated by building a flat house. Kimber v. Admans, 6o L. J. Ch., N. S., 296
(ixoo) ; Pank v. Eaton, 115 Mo. App. 171 (i9o5); but it does forbid a,
Andby gen
stable, Schwenck v. Campbell, ii Abb. Prac. 292 (N. isY.notI6o).
the
broken
house,
erally a covenant not to erect a tenement
erection of a high-class apartment house, Ranger v. Lee, 6 Misc. Rep. 144

(N. Y. i).

This subject is fully discussed in an able note in 45 L R.A. (N. S.), 726.
SALES-BILL OF LAMNG-DLIV-ERY To CARRIFR-A sight draft drawn on
the agent of the vendor was attached to the bill of lading, naming subvendee as consignee. Consignee by contract released the carrier on delivery
of the goods at their siding. Held: Title to the goods passed to consignee
upon .their delivery to the carrier. Cotton Oil Co. v. Matheson, 89 S. E.
478 (S. C. 1916).
A bill of lading is the symbol of the property described therein and
its indorsement by consignor passes title. Supply Co. v. Mclnturff, 179

-RECENT CASES

197

S. NV. 99 (Ark. ig6); Ry.- v. Mounts, 144 Pac. io36 (Okla. x9i5). Delivery to carrier and taking of the bill of lading in the name of the vendee,
as in. the principal case, passes title to the goods, Bacharach v. Freight
Line, 133 Pa. 414 (189o); and a delivery thereunder without the bill of
lading would relieve the carrier, irrespective of any agreement between
the parties, Bank v. Elliot, 86 N. W. 44 (Minn. igoi). As between the
contracting parties, however, the intention of the parties governs and this
is expressed by the terms of the paper. Emery v. Bank, 18 Am. Rep. 299
(Ohio 1874). Taking out the bill of lading in the name of.the vendor is
Prima facie evidence of an intent to reserve the title, Armstrong v. Coyne,
67 Pac. 537 (Kan. 90o2), and this is strengthened by the fact that a sight
draft on the vendee is attached to such a bill of lading. Dows v. Bank, 91
U. S. 618 (1875); Storage Co. v. Ry., 222 Mass. 535 (i916). In such a
case a vendor may by discounting the draft with a bill of lading pass good
title. Bank v. Isenberg, 59 Super. 162 (Pa. igi6). On the other hand,
taking out the bill of lading in the name of vendee is evidence ol an
intent to pass title. Bank v. Elliot, 86 N. W. 454 (Minn. igox). But if a
sight draft on vendee is attached title does not pass, Bank v. Hartzell, 55
Sup. 56 (Pa. 1914), and a discount of the'draft and transfer of the bill of
lading passes a special property to the goods, which, however, .passes to
vendee upon tender of the purchase price, Mirabita v. Bank, L. R. 3 Excheq.
Div. 64 (Eng. 1878); or becomes absolute in the discounting bank upon
the refusal of vendee to pay, Ex Porte Hood, Q7 So. io7 ZAla. i915).
By statute, some states have made bills of lading negotiable, Pennsylvania. Act of September 24, 1866, P. L. x363 (1867) ; Code of Virginia, edition
of x86o, p. 6-o; but that does not give them all the incidents usually given
to "law merchant" negotiable papers, Shaw v. P. IL R., io7 U. S. 557 (i8;9),
though the negotiation of a bill of lading to a bona-fide purchaser for.value
will defeat vendor's right of stoppage i transitu, Lukbarrow v. Mason, 6
East 2o (Eng. 1793).
SALE -REscissiom-DuTY TO RETuaN-In an action by the vendee to
recover the purchase price paid for a silo, alleging failure on vendor's
part to supply the missing parts, the latter raised as a defense the vendees
failure to return the silo. Held: The refusal of the vendor to accept the
silo relieved the vendee of his obligation to return it. Lake v. Western Silo
Co., 158 N. W. 673 (Iowa 1916).
Generally. if a buyer rescinds a contract of sale he must return, or
offer to return, all that he has received under the contract, to the place
where he received it. National Improvement and Construction Co. v. Maiken,
xo3 Iowa 118 (1897); Allaire. Woodward & Co. v. Cole. 187 S. W. 816
(Mo. 1x16). However. the buyer need not return, or offer to return, the
subject-matter of the sale where the vendor refuses to accept it. Milliken
v. Skillings, 89 Me. i8o (1896); Jones v. McGinn, 1o4 Pac. 994 (Ore. 1914).
The principal case comes within the above exception. No return is necessary if the subject-matter is worthless. Harris v. Daley, ,m5 Ga. 511 (19o4).
The vendee must act within a reasonable time or he will be deemed to have
accepted the goods. Manley v. Crescent Novelty Co., io3 Mo. App. 135
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(19o3); Collins v. Skillings, 112 N. . 938 (Mass. i916). They must be
returned in a condition reasonable under the circumstances. Thompson v.
Chambers, i3 Pa. Super. Ct. 213 (igoo). The vendee must rescind the
whole contract unequivocally and without reservation. Lowry v. Rosengrant,
71 So. 439 (Ala. 1916). The principal case seems to be based on the rule
that the vendee may rescind where lie does not receive all that the contract
specified. McCormick Harvester Machine Co. v. Courtright, 54 Neb. 18
(1898); Rownd v. Hollenbeck, io8 N. W. 259 (Neb. igo6). As a general
rule he must be able to place the vendor in statu quo atc. Case Threshing
Machine Co. v. Lyons, 24 Ky. L R. 1862 (19o3).
SAvINGs BANKS-PAYMENT TO OTHER THAN DEPosiToR-B-LAwsNEGLIGENcE-A pass book of a savings bank, containing the usual by-law

for the protection of the bank in case payment be made to one holding
the book, was presented together with a forged order, by one known by
the bank to have acted previously as agent for the depositor and money
was received thereon. Held: The bank was not liable to depositor for
such payment. Commonwealth Bank v. Goodman, 97 Atl. ioo5 (Md. 1916).
The gen-,ral rule is that by-laws of savings banks providing that payments made to a holder of the book shall be binding on depositor are
reasonable and necessary for the protection of the bank. Burill v. The
Dollar Savings Bank, 92 Pa. 134 (i879); The Hough Ave. Savings & Banking Company v. Anderson, 78 Ohio St. 341 (19o8). Knowledge of these
by-laws, when copied in the pass book, will be charged to the depositor
even though the latter be illiterate. Dolan v. Provident Institution for
Savings, 127 Mass. 183 (1879). In such a case, however, a bank may be
held to be negligent in not informing such a depositor of the presence of
by-laws in the book. Siegel v. State Bank, 123 N. Y. S. 221 (1910).

Nevertheless, it has been held that such clauses do not relieve a savings
bank of the duty of reasonable care and diligence to prevent payment to
a wrong person. Dinini v. The Mechanics Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225
(1912); Gearns v. Bowery Savings Bank, 135 N. Y. 557 (1892). Lack of
such ordinary care on the part of the bank is generally held to be a question
of fact for the jury. Chase v. Waterbury Savings Bank, 77 Conn. 295
(igo4), and Hough Ave. Banking Company v. Anderson, supra. See howwhere
ever, Hankowska v. Buffalo Savings Bank, I55 N. Y. S.694 (i913),
bank
the
that
facts
undisputed
from
law
of
matter
a
the court found as
was negligent. The burden of proof is on the depositor to show negligence.
Israel v. Bowery Savings Bank, 9 Daly 5o7 (N. Y. i88i).
The negligence of the depositor in not taking proper care of his pass
book has often bien urged by the bank as a defense in actions like the
one in the principal case but the courts hold that such a fact is immaterial.
"The question of contributory negligence is not involved," Brown v. Merrimack River Savings Bank, 67 N. H. 549, etc. (1893); Ladd v. Augusta Savings Bank, 96 Me. 5io (1902).
SrECIIC PERFORMANCECONTRAcTS-PUBUc INTEREsT-A bill for specific
performance of a covenant to repair and maintain in repair was brought
-by a lessor, who was engaged in the business of furnishing electric light
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and power to the city under a franchise, against the assignee of the lessee.
Held: Specific performance was granted. Edison Illuminating Co. v. Eastern
Pennsylvania Power Co., 98 At. 652 (xi6).
It is a well settled rule that specific performance will not be granted
of contracts, where the court would be obliged to supervise the performance
for a long period of time. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. v. Taff Vale
R. R. Co., L. R. Ch. App. 33 (874).
Nor will a contract that requires
some special skill, labor or service be specifically enforced. Clark v. Price,
2 Williams Ch 157 (89ig).
Whdre, howe er, the contract relates to the management and control
of railroads or other agencies of transportation, which enjoy special privileges conferred by statute, ordinance, or franchise, specific performance
thereof will generally be granted by courts of equity. See dictum in Standard
Fashion Co. v. Siegel Cooper Co., 5i N. E. 4o8 (N. Y. I898). Accordingly,
contracts by a railroad to run its trains, Schmidtz v. L. & N. R. R., ioi
Ky. 441 (1897); to make reasonable regulations to allow another railroad
to run its trains on the covenantor's tracks and to maintain tracks and
terminal facilities, Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. I (Mo. i89o) ; to give tracking rights and make schedules, Union Pac. R. R. v. Chicago R. R., 163 U. S.
564 (1896) ; to maintain crossing frogs and provide signals and watchmen,
L & N. R. R. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., I74 IlL. 448 (i88) ; to erect neat and
ornamental buildings, Columbus City v. R. R. Co., 25 Ohio C. C. R- 663
(19o4); by a street car line to run horse cars, P. P. R. R. Co. v. Coney
Island R. R. Co., i44 IN. Y. 152 ('894), have been specifically enforced.
Lone Star Salt Co. v. Texas Short Line R. R. Co., 99 Tex. 434 (9o6), contra.
In Patton v. Monongahela Street R. R. Co., 75 At. 589 (Pa. i9io), a cotitract
to lay tracks and repair the street was specifically enforced, but in City of
Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh R. R. Co., 83 At. 67 (Pa. 1912), a contract to
repair streets was held not enforceable.
The reason for the exception is the interest that the public has in the
enforcement of railroads' contracts. L. & N. R. R. v. M. & T. R. R., 92
Tenn. 68i (1893). Therefore, where the public interest is not present,
specific performance of railroad contracts is not granted. Murdfeldt v. N.
Y. West Shore R. R, io2 N. Y. 7o3 (i886); Conger v. N. Y. 'West Shore
R R., i2o N. Y. 29 (89o).
A covenant to keep a flag station was specifically enforced with the.
limitation that if the interests of the public at any time demanded its
removal that the covenantee be obliged to take damages in lieu of the
performance. Parrott v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R., 8i S. E. 348 (N. C. 19T4).
The exception has been generally confined to contracts by agencies for
transportation, but in Franklin Tel. Co. v. Harrison, T45 U. S. 459 (Pa.
i892), a contract by a telegraph company to allow the use of its wire was
enforced and in one case, Hubbard City v. Bounds, 95 S. NV. 69 (Tex. i9o6),
a contract by an individual to supply and maintain a waterworks system
was specifically enforced. Generally, a contract by an individual extending
over a long Period of time will not be enforced, no matter how great the
public interest. See Kidd v. McGinnis, i N. D. 331 (i89r); LaHogue
District v. Watts, r79 Fed. 69o (I1. igio); Tim v. Van Meter Lumber Co.,
51 So. 459 (Miss. xgo).
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STATE HIGHWAYS-DUTY TO MAINTAIN COUNTY BRIDGES-MANDAMUS-

A bridge constructed as a county bridge located on a highway taken over
by the state under the Sproul Act of 'May 31, 1911, P. L. 468, was condemned by the county commissioners. Held: The duty of reconstruction
devolved upon the county and could be enforced by mandamus. Commonwealth v. Bird, 98 Atl. 648 (Pa. 1916). This decision sets at rest two
conflicting lower court decisions by overruling Fortney v. Centre County
Commissioners, and following an unreported decision of the Blair County
courts, referred to in the Centre County case.
In order to give county commis;ioners authority to build a bridge in
the first instance the following elements must concur: (I) Report of viewers
that bridge is necessary and too expensive for township; (2) Affirmative
action on that report by court, grand jury and county commissioners; (3)
Entry of record of bridge as a county bridge. Act of June 13, 1836, P. L.
55x; Commonwealth v. Bowman, 218 Pa. 330 (19o7). Where a public highway on one side of a bridge has been abandoned, the'county is no longer
obligated to kecp up the bridge, Commonwealth v. Kessler, 222 Pa. 32 (i9o8) ;
but a township is not boupd to construct a bridge over a public road to
take the place of a ford. Naugle v. Nescopeck Township, 225 Pa. 68 (Pa.
In New Jersey, by statute, the State Department of Public Roads is
not authorized to repair bridges, P. L. 1912, p. 836, yet when the State
Commissioner of Public Roads deems a bridge unsafe, unsuited or inadequate to the needs of the road or the traffic which it serves, or of such
design or character as requires too frequent repairs, he may make written
agreement to bear a part of the cost with the public body charged with such
construction up to twenty per Ccntuln of the cost, P. L: 1913, p. 643. But
where a public bridge exists over a navigable river not less than four thousand feet in length and connecting two municipalities in the state, onethird the cost of maintenance is borne by the state, P. L. 1912, p. 924.
Where highway commissioners were empowered to construct necessary bridges
on a trunk line road and branch roads to feed the same, the duty of building
bridges on branch roads was upon the county. Patterson v. Commissioners
of Swain County. 87 S. E. 317 (N. C. 1915). Where the duty to repair a
bridge is aibsolute, it is well settled that mandamus will issue to compel the
performance of that duty, State 'v. Board of Freeholders of Sussex, .76
N. J. L. 454, and thus when one county refused to join in repairing an
inter-county bridge over a navigable river, it was compelled to join with
the other county by mandamus. Douglas Co. Commissioners v. Leavenworth
Co. Commissioners, i57 Pac. 118o (Kans. 1916). It follows that, where
there is a liability on behalf of an adjoining county for maintenance of an
inter-county bridge, the county assuming the burden may recover one-half
the cost of repairing the structure, Peya Kaha Co. v. Brown County, 156
N. W. SO7 ('Neb. ri916). At common law, any person authorized to interfere with a lawful highway by cutting through same, must build and
maintain a bridge over the gap until such time as he restores the highway
to its original condition. Hertfordshire Council v. New River Co., 2 Ch.
513 (Eng. 9o.4); City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Water Co. (Ind.
1916).
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SUNDAY-VORKS OF NESITY--OPERATION OF A BARBER

Snop-Barber-

ing comes within a statute prohibiting "any work or business," or anyone
"found at a trade or calling" from pursuing it on -Sunday, and is not within
"works of necessity or charity" which are excepted. Gray v. Commonwealth,
x88 S. NV. 354 (Ky. xi6).
It was no offense at common law to work at a trade on Sunday, Rex
v. Brotherton, i Strange 7o2 (Eng. 1719); or to labor, State v. Williams,
4 Ired. 400 (N. C. 1843) ; or to keep shop and sell goods, State v. Brooksbank, 6 Ired. 73 (N. C. 1845). At present the great majority of jurisdictions, following the English statute of 29 Charles I, have general Sunday
laws and many prohibit barbering on Sunday by special enactment. As in
the principal case, barbering is generally held to come within the terms
of a general Sunday law. Commonwealth v. Valdman, 14o Pa. 89 (igi).
This is held whether the statute prohibits keeping open a shop and doing
business therein, Commonwealth v. Dextra, 143 Mass. 28 (1886); or laboring
therein, State v. Frederick, 45 Ark. 347 (i885). And the court will take
judicial notice of the fact that barbering is laboring. State v. Nesbit, 8
Kans. App. io4 (1898). It has been held that a barber is a "workman"
within such a statute. Regina v. Taylor, i9 Can. Law Journal, N. S., 362
(1883). But he has not been held within the terms "tradesman, artificer,
workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever." Palmer v. Snow, L. R.
[igoo] i Q. B. D. 723 (Eng. x9oo). Barber shop is not a "shop . . . or
place of business . . . for the, purpose of trade or sale of goods, wares,
and merchandise." State v. Krech, io Wash. i66 (1894).
A statute prohibiting barbering on Sunday is constitutional. Petit v.
Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164 (1899); Stanfeal v. State, 3 Ohio St. 24 (I9o8).
It is within the state's police power. People v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 19S
(i896) ; State v. Petit, 74 Minn. 376 (i8g8). Contra, ex parte Jentzsch, 112
It subserves to the promotion of the general welfare.
Cal. 468 (1896).
McClelland v. Denver, 36 Colo. 486 (iqo6); Ex pare Kennedy, 42 Tex. Cr.
(z896). It does not
20
App. 148 (1poo). Contra, Eden v. People, 161 I11.
unduly restrain personal liberty, State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318 (1902). It is
not special legislation, Ex pare Northrup, 41 Ore. 489 (9oz); nor class
legislation, People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151 (i8g4); nor is it discriminatory,
Stark v. Backus, 140 Wis. 557 (1902). Contra, Bartlett, J., dissenting, in
People v. Havnor, supra. This rule applies where the violators are persons,
as Seventh Day Adventists, who duly observe another day as Sabbath.
State v. Bergfeldt, 41 Wash. 234 (igo5), overruling Tacoma v. Krech, 15
Wash. 296 (T896). But some statutes, as that of the principal case, except
such persons from the provisions of the statute. It seems that a special
law applying to barbers where there is a general Sunday law is unconstitutional. State v. Graneman, 132 Mo. 326 (1896); Stratman v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 5oo (ig9o). Contra, Briger v. State, 1o2 Tenn. To3 (x898).
One barber cannot restrain a competitor from violating the Sunday law
for no property rights are invaded. York v. Ysagname, 3X Tex. Civ. App.
26 (i9o2). Though barbering on Sunday is a violation of the statute, it
is not an indictable nuisance. State v. Lorry, 7 Baxter 95 (Tenn. 1874).
As was held in the principal case, barbering is not a work of necessity

-
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to come within the exception to a general Sunday statute. Phillips v. Innes,
4 Cl. & F. 234 (Eng. 1837); Commonwealth v. Waldman, supra. Contra,
Bartlett, J., dissenting in People v. Havnor, siupra. The court may take
judicial notice that barbering is not a necessity, State v. Frederick, 45 Ark.
347 (1885), or make it solely a question of fact for the jury. Ungericht v.
State, u9 Ind. 379 (1889); Sparth v. State, io Ohio Dec, Reprints, 639
(1889).
It seems that the question depends largely on the circumstances of
the particular case. Commonwealth v. Williams, i Pearson 6i (Pa. 1853);
Stone v. Graves, 145 Mass. 353 (1887). It is no defense to show that the
patrons were travelers at a large city, State v. Schatt, 128 Mo. App. 622
(i9o7), or that they were members of a club and at the club house. McCain
v. State, 2 Ga. App. 389 (z9o7). The fact that it is very convenient or a
matter of personal cleanliness for the patrons to have the work done does not
make it a necessity. Phillips v. Innes, and McCain v. State, supra. But the
statutes does not prevent a man from shaving himself or having a servant
do it. State v. Petit, and State v. Sopher, supra.
TORTS-CONTRBUTORY

NEGLIGENCE

OF CHAUFFEUR

Nor

IMPUTED" TO

OWNER'S GUEST-The contributory negligence of the chauffeur cannot be
imputed to one traveling in the vehicle by invitation from the owner to
prevent recovery by the passenger against the negligent third party. St.
Louis & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Bell, 159 Pac. 336 (Okla. 1916).
The rule that the occupant of a vehicle will be imputed with the negligence of the driver is based upon the theory of the nearness of identity
between the passenger and the vehicle, as explained in the leading case of
Thorgood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115 ('849). This is followed in a few states.
Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440 (1866); Lawson v. Fond du Lac, 141 Wis.
57 (igog); Lake v. Springville, i53 N. W. 69o (Mich. 1915); and in Payne
v. R. R. Co., 39 Ia. 525 (x874), though on the ground that the person injured
must rely on the driver's diligence for recovery, and the negligence of the
driver defeats the right to recover. But this doctrine has been repudiated
in England, The Bernina, L. R. 12 Probate Div. 58 (z887), and is generally
disapproved in this country. Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 (1886); Dean
v. Pa. it R Co., 129 Pa. 514 (1889). The negligence of the driver was
not imputed to the guest who had suggested the trip, Reading Twp. v. Telfer,
57 Kan. 798 (1897), nor to one having authority to indicate the route, Little
v. Hackett, supra; nor to the wife of the driver, Knoxville Light Co. v.
Vangilder, 178 S. W. 1117 (Tenn. x9iS). For a contra wife case, see
Carlisle v. Sheldon, supra. To render one liable on the ground of imputed
negligence, the relation either of master and servant or principal and agent
must exist, or tie parties must be engaged in a joint enterprise, in which
there is a community of interests in the object or the purposes of the
undertaking and the right to govern the conduct of the other. A member
of partnership has been held liable for the negligent driving of his partner
with whom he was riding on an errand for firm's business. Van Horn v.
Simpson, x53 N. V. 883 (S. Dak. 1915). The rule that the negligence of
the driver will not be imputed to the passenger does not apply where the
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passenger has full knowledge of the danger and voluntarily incurs the
risk, Robeillard v. Rwy. Co., 216 Fed. 5o3 (1914), nor where he was contributorily negligent in not exercising diligence to avoid the accident, Dean
v. Pa. R. R. Co., supra, even though the plaintiff had no control over-the
driver.

Rwy. Co. v. Bussey, 71 Pac. 261 (Kan. i9o3).

WILLS-WHAT CONSTITLTEs-The testator left an unsigned letter addressed to his executor containing directions and explanations, and referring
to "my will made." The letter and will were attached by clamps and in
a sealed envelope indorsed.by the testator as his last will and testament.
Held: The letter formed no part of the will. In re Keith's Est, i59 Pac.
R. 7o5 (Cal. 1916).
Several papers together may constitute the last will of the testator.
Jones v. Habeisham, 63 Ga. 146 (1876). Nor need they be physically connected if the sense is continuous and clear throughout. Appeal of Wykoff,
i5 Pa. 281 (185o); Martin v. Exec., 4 Strob. i88 (S. C. i86o). Even if
written at different times, if the one of later date contains no revocatory
clause, all will be probated. Whitney v. Hennington, 85 Pac. 84 (Col. i9o6).
But the animus Iestandi must be present and the paper expressive of the
maker's intent respecting the posthumous destination of his property. Stein
v. North, 3 Yeates 324 (Pa. 1802); Whyte v. Pollok, 7 App. Cases ioo
(Eng. 1882). It has been held that a letter merely referring to a previously
made will is not testamentary and entitled to probate. It re Baer's Estate,
xi D. R. 471 (Pa. 19o2). Nor does the fact that the writing is on the
same sheet as the will make it so. Conboy v. Jennings, I Thompson and C.
62 (N. Y. 1873). In Pennsylvania the courts have gone far in admitting
documents to probate. Each case, it has been held, is dependent on the
language of the paper offered as expressive of the intent of the author,
and precedent rarely affords much aid. Gaston's Estate, 188 Pa. 374 (898).
Enclosing unsigned dispositive papers in an indorsed envelope constitutes
the whole a will. Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. i59 (z88x); Harrison's Estate,
196 Pa. 576 (igoo). But an address on a box "to my attorney when I
die" does not constitute it, and all within, part of a formally prepared will.
li re Jacoby's Estate, Igo Pa. St. 382 (1899). Nor is an unsigned memorandum to the legatee expressing certain desires of the testator part of a
duly endorsed will on the previous page. Bowlby v. Thunder, io$ Pa. x73
(1884).

